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The Adversarial Defence Lawyer: Myths, Disclosure and Efficiency – 
A Contemporary Analysis of the Role in the Era of the Criminal 
Procedure Rules 
Ed Johnston1 
In the current criminal justice climate, disclosure is extremely topical. Since the turn of 2018 
there have been a number of cases which have collapsed as a result of disclosure failings.2 
Whilst these cases concern CPS disclosure failings, the cases have brought a great deal of 
attention to an often-ignored area of criminal procedure. These cases highlight the 
problematic nature of disclosure and the more general problems with an adversarial approach. 
The approach is now underscored by a drive for efficiency in the post-Auld Review era, 
which seeks to increase the efficiency of the adversarial criminal trial by implementing a 
number of efficiency drivers.3 Yet, questions remain about how the changes of legislation and 
judicial culture have impacted the fair trial rights afforded to the defendant and the role of the 
defence lawyer. This article explores the evolution of adversarialism and suggests that whilst 
the system may be cumbersome, the inherent due process safeguard contained within the 
process are a worthy price. However, since the dawn of the 21st Century, adversarialism has 
been diluted at an accelerated  rate and has given rise to a more managerial mantra which this 
article will term the ‘New Regime.’ The New Regime has prioritised efficiency over 
                                                            
1 Ed Johnston, Senior Lecturer in Law, Bristol Law School, edward2.johnston@uwe.ac.uk  
2 See Liam Allen, Allan - A joint review of the disclosure process in the case of R v Allan: Findings and 
recommendations for the Metropolitan Police Service and CPS London (January 2018), Samson Makele - L. 
Dearden, “Rape case against Eritrean man collapses after photos showing woman ‘snuggling’ with him 
uncovered”, The Independent, 15 January 2018, http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/crime/rape-case-
collapses-disclosure-eritrean-man-makele-photos-cuddling-snuggling-woman-metropolitan-a8160816.html, 
Isaac Itiary - D. Brown, “Detective Mark Azariah removed from duty after two rape trials collapse in a week”, 
The Times, 21 December 2017 and Oliver Mears - S. Walter, J. Maidment, “Oxford University student cleared 
of rape charge as yet another case collapses days before trial begins”, The Telegraph, 18 January 
2018, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2018/01/18/oxford-university-student-cleared-rape-charge-yet-another-
case/. 
3 CrimPR Rule 1.1(2)(e) suggests that the overriding objective to ‘deal with cases justly’ can be met by dealing 
with cases efficiently and expeditiously. This article contends that the focus of criminal procedure over the last 
20 years has been to satisfying this goal. A number of reviews and programmes  have been established to 
improve efficiency, particularly in the magistrates courts inter alia R. Auld, A Review of the Criminal Courts of 
England and Wales, (2001); Courts and Tribunals Judiciary, Better Case Management available at 
www.judiciary.gov.uk/publications/better-case-management; Gross LJ, Review of Disclosure in Criminal 
Proceedings, Judiciary of England and Wales [https://www.judiciary.uk/wp-
content/uploads/JCO/Documents/Reports/disclosure_criminal_courts.pdf] and Sir Brain Leveson, Review of 
Efficiency in Criminal Proceedings (London, Judicart of England and Wales, 2015) 
https://www.judiciary.gov.uk/wp-content/uploads/2015/01/review-of-efficiency-in-criminal-proceedings-
20151.pdf. 
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effectiveness and fundamentally shifted the classic position of the defence lawyer. The 
empirical work is taken from semi-structured interviews designed to explore how practising 
defence lawyers perceive their own role, the findings suggest that defence lawyers struggle to 
view themselves as classically adversarial when they have a number of competing obligations 
and duties imposed by both the Criminal Procedure Rules [CrimPR]. This work follows in 
the footsteps of numerous academics who argue that adversarialism is on the wane. Already 
in 1994 McConville, Hodgson, Bridges and Pavlovic4 suggested that adversarial lawyers did 
not exist in reality and did not offer clients a zealous adversarial defence. More recently, 
McEwan5 claimed that the CrimPR weakened the adversarial nature of the criminal process 
in England and Wales. Further, Owusu-Bempah6 argues that forcing the defendant to 
participate in the criminal process fundamentally alters the adversarial framework and finally 
Quirk7 asserts that the changes made to the Right to Silence by the Criminal Justice and 
Public Order Act 1994 paved the way for the dawn of the disclosure regime and was arguably 
the genesis of the new regime. The pursuit of greater efficiency compels the defendant to 
participate to a greater degree and ultimately, undermines the due process protections that the 
adversarial process provides, thus heightening the possibility of a miscarriage of justice.  
 
This article is based on a small empirical project that was carried out between 2015 and 
2016.8 The first part of the article sets the scene by examining the drive for efficiency and the 
                                                            
4 M. McConville, J. Hodgson, L. Bridges and A. Pavlovic, Standing Accused (Clarendon Press: Oxford 1994).   
5 J. McEwan, ‘Truth, Efficiency and Co-operation in Modern Criminal Justice’, [2013] Current Legal 
Problems, Vol 1. 66(1); McEwan J, ‘From Adversarialism to Managerialism: Criminal Justice in 
Transition’, [2011] Legal Studies, Vol 31(3).  
6 A. Owusu-Bempah, ‘Defence Participation through Pre-Trial Disclosure: Issues and Implications’, (2013) 
17 E&P 183; A. Owusu-Bempah, Defendant Participation in the Criminal Process (Routledge, 2017)  
7 H. Quirk, ‘The Significance of Culture in the Criminal Procedure Reform: Why the Revised Disclosure 
Scheme Cannot Work’ (2006) 10 Int. Journal of Evidence and Proof 1.; Quirk H, ‘The Right of Silence in 
England and Wales: Sacred Cow, Sacrificial Lamb or Trojan Horse?’ in J. Jackson and S. Summers (eds), 
Obstacles to Fairness in Criminal Proceedings: Individual Rights and Institutional Forms, 2018.   
8 Methodology - Fundamentally, the aim of the research is to develop a deeper picture of the impact of the 
Criminal Procedure and Investigations Act 1996 (CPIA 1996) and the Criminal Procedure Rules (CrimPR) from 
a defence lawyer’s point of view. With this aim, the author carried out 24 semi-structured interviews with 
practicing defence lawyers with varying years of experience. The vast majority of participants were selected via 
Twitter and then the other participants were recruited via snowballing. This is ‘when the researcher accesses 
informants through contact information that is provided by other informants.’ The potential reach of using 
Twitter is vast and very attractive to an empirical research study. A person can ‘tweet’ another user directly 
without requiring prior permission. Further to this, other users can share existing information with their own 
followers by ‘re-tweeting’ a tweet. This extends the reach of the original tweet as it will be seen by far more 
users. Twitter was selected over other forms of social media as it was easier to identify lawyers and to then 
approach them from a position of no pre-existing relationship. From tailoring my own personal account it was 
clear that there is a large community of defence lawyers and academics with an interest in criminal defence on 
Twitter. The length of experience differed greatly between the lawyers; ideally, the study sought lawyers who 
were in practice prior to the disclosure changes made by the CPIA 1996 and those who have only practiced with 
a culture of defence disclosure imbedded in their practice. This goal was successful, the most experienced 
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implications of the Auld Review. The second part analyses how the efficiency drivers 
manifested in practice, focusing on the use of the Case Management Forms and the Early 
Guilty Plea regimes, as well as the impact of the Legal Aid cuts. The article then examines 
the inadequate sanctions for failing to comply with the new regimes before drawing to a close 
with the suggestion that traditional adversarial values have been eroded and replaced with a 
managerial process that compels the defendant to take part in proceedings whilst weakening 
the due process protections afforded to them which ultimately dilutes the role of the 
adversarial defence lawyer. 
 
 
A Brief History of Defence Disclosure 
The disclosure regime is a relatively recent creation and until the mid-1990s, disclosure was 
generally an obligation for the prosecution to discharge, save in instance of alibi and expert 
evidence.9 The regime of prosecution disclosure was viewed as a mechanism to address the 
inequality of arms between the prosecution and the defence. As the prosecution was State 
funded, they should have to disclose facts of their case to the defence as there is a clear 
imbalance of resource between the two. R v Bryant and Dickson10 is commonly regarded as 
the start of the process in which the courts begin impose a duty on the prosecution to disclose 
material that may lead to the acquittal of the accused.11 The case established an obligation on 
the prosecution to make available to the defence witnesses whom the prosecution knew could 
                                                                                                                                                                                         
lawyer in the group had practiced criminal law for 40 years, whereas the most recently qualified criminal lawyer 
had 4 years’ experience. The mean length of experience was almost 17 years. The choice for semi-structured 
interviews is justified in the following manner. Bearing in mind that the general aim of the interview is to 
encourage the participants to talk at length about their own experiences and thoughts and that the process is not 
concerned with obtaining the ‘right’ answer but what the lawyer thinks a structured interview might lead to 
short, simple, general or abstract answers to the interviewer’s questions. In contrast, the semi-structured 
interview allows the participants to talk about the CPIA 1996 and CrimPR in terms of their own frames of 
reference; by doing this the participants also maximize the interviewer’s own understanding of their responses. 
Although the interviewer has a clear set of issues, i.e. the main questions, that has to be addressed he/she is 
prepared to be flexible in terms of allowing the interviewee to develop ideas and speak more widely on the 
issues raised. The emphasis is on the interviewee elaborating on key points of interest and broaching a broader 
range of issues. Further, the semi-structured interviews allowed the interviewer to ask follow-up questions, 
exploring the areas of ambiguity and seeking clarification on any relevant issue, as well as probe the answers 
given by the participant.  
9 Alibi evidence had to be closed pursuant to S.11 Criminal Justice Act 1967 and Expert evidence was required 
to be disclosed under S.2(1) Criminal Justice Act 1987.    
10 [1946] 31 Cr App R 146. Prior to Bryant and Dickson, in the case R v Clarke (1930) 22 Cr App R 58 the court 
held that where there is a discrepancy between a witness’s evidence at trial and his statements made previously 
to the police, the prosecution should consider if an actual copy of the witness’s statement should be disclosed 
rather than just information given about it. 
11 D. Corker and S. Parkinson, (2010) Disclosure in Criminal Proceedings (Oxford University Press: Oxford) at 
p. 3. 
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give material evidence. The rule in Bryant and Dickson was extended further by Dallison v 
Caffery.12 In Lord Justice Denning’s words:  
 
if he [the prosecutor] knows of a credible witness who can speak [of] 
material facts which tends to show the prisoner to be innocent, he must 
either call that witness themselves or make the statement available ... it 
would be highly reprehensible to conceal … the evidence which such a 
witness can give.13 
 
For Lord Denning, disclosure was about ensuring that justice was done and not simply 
following a particular rule; it was the spirit of the rule that should prevail, not its letter.14 
Until the 1960s, obligations to disclose information were placed exclusively upon the 
prosecution. The Criminal Justice Act 1967 was the first exception to this general rule, s.11 
of which states that in trials on indictment that the defendant shall have to give notice of the 
particulars of an alibi witness.15  
 
In 1981, the ‘first attempt by the government, without recourse to statute, to comprehensively 
improve and overhaul the disclosure system’16 was made The guidelines created a set of 
criteria for determining what should and should not be disclosed and established the notion of 
disclosing ‘unused material;’ which was defined as: 
(i) Witness statements and documents not included in the committal bundle; 
(ii) Statements of witnesses who are to be called at committal, and any documents 
referred to therein; and 
(iii) The unedited version of edited statements included in the committal bundle.17 
In 1986, the Fraud Trials Committee published their report (hereafter, the Roskill 
Committee), Lord Roskill chairing the report. The findings of the Committee led to the 
second major development in the area of defence disclosure. The Committee was established 
                                                            
12 [1965] 1 QB 348. 
13Ibid per Lord Denning M.R. at para 369. 
14 Supra fn.283 at p.3. 
15 s.11(1) Criminal Justice Act 1967. 
16 Supra fn.282 at p.7. 
17Guidelines for the disclosure of “unused material” to the defence in case to be tried on indictment. (1982) 74 
Cr App R 302, paragraph 1. Although the guidelines are non-statutory to all intents and purposes they are 
intended to have the force of a statutory provision. 
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because, it was said, the public no longer believed the legal system was capable of bringing 
the perpetrators of serious frauds to book.18 The Committee found that the legal system was 
too archaic, cumbersome and unreliable. Every stage of the legal process was an ‘open 
invitation to blatant delay and abuse.’19 Owing to this blatant abuse the Committee stated in 
its summary that radical reform was necessary. Although the terms of reference for the report 
related to fraud trials the Committee argued that the changes could ‘be of benefit to a wider 
range of criminal cases’.20 The Committee believed that forcing the defence to outline its case 
in advance of trial would make the trial both ‘shorter and more efficient’. Furthermore, this 
would make the trial clearer for the jury, if they were told at the outset what part of the 
prosecution’s case the defence intended to challenge. Requiring the defence to disclose a case 
outline would reduce the risk of fabricated defences; the prosecution would be able to 
investigate in advance any defence claims that required investigation.21 However, the 
Committee admitted that they had been unable to empirically test the truth of the assertion 
that the jury’s understanding of the case is impaired where it is not clear at the outset what the 
case may be.  
 
The Committee considered a number of objections to the proposal. Firstly it accepted that the 
main objection was that the proposal was an infringement of a fundamental principle of our 
criminal law; that the burden of proof rests with the prosecution. A further objection to the 
proposal was the lack of an effective sanction against a defendant who fails to comply with 
the provisions. To alleviate any fear that a defence disclosure regime would weaken the 
burden of the proof, the Commission stated:  
 
‘The prosecution would still have to prepare their case fully … including making 
early disclosure of their evidence … we recognise that the burden of proof would be 
affected if the prosecution were allowed to alter the nature of their case once the 
defence had been disclosed. To avoid this possibility, any proposal would therefore 
have to involve the prosecution’s case being “fixed” before the defence could show 
his hand. If the prosecution sought to change their ground … to overwhelm the case 
put forward by the defence, the judge might well be justified in intervening to stop the 
                                                            
18 The Fraud Trials Committee, Chairman: The Right Honourable Lord Roskill, P.C, (HMSO: 1986) p.1 para 1. 
19 ibid p.1 para 1. 
20 ibid p.2 at para 4. The Committee did stop of recommending any proposal to anything other than fraud cases, 
they would leave that discussion for those with wider concerns than then own.  
21 The Fraud Trials Committee, Chairman: The Right Honorable Lord Roskill, P.C, (HMSO: 1986) p103 at para 
6.72. 
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case altogether or, if it were not too late, to ensure that the prosecution adhered to the 
original case’.22 
 
By implementing the safety net of allowing the judges to intervene should the prosecution 
deviate from their original case, the Committee believed the burden of proof would remain 
intact. Following the Roskill Committee’s report, the Government enacted the Criminal 
Justice Act 1987. The Act provided that in serious fraud cases, persons can be required to 
give information about and produce documents concerning the investigation. Section 2(3) 
Criminal Justice Act 1988 allowed the director of the investigation ‘… to require the person 
under investigation, or any other person to produce any specified document which appear to 
the Director to relate to any matter relevant to the investigation …’.23 The Crown Court 
(Advance Notice of Expert Evidence) Rules24 provided that any statement in writing of any 
finding or opinion of an expert upon which a party intended to rely on had to be disclosed as 
soon as practicable after committal. These obligations in the mid 1980s were the first 
deviation from the notion that the accused does not have to outline any aspect of his defence 
prior to trial, save for any alibi notifications.  
 
The provisions of the 19080s were dramatically enhanced during the mid-1990s, the defence 
disclosure regime was radically overhauled by the Criminal Procedure and Investigations Act 
1996. The provisions compelled the defendant to disclose aspects of his defence for 
indictable-only cases.25 The content of the defence statement was defined by s.5(6). It is a 
written statement: 
 
(a) setting out in general terms the nature of the accused’s defence; 
(b) indicating the matters on which he takes issue with the prosecution; 
(c) setting out, in the case of each such matter, the reason why he takes issue with the 
prosecution. 
 
                                                            
22 ibid  p104 at para 6.75. 
23 S.2(3) Criminal Justice Act 1988. 
24 SI 1987/716. 
25 They do not apply to summary trials, although section 6(2) does allow the accused to voluntarily provide a 
defence statement to the prosecution Richard Card and Richard Ward believe the section is unnecessary as it is 
always open to the accused to disclose facts about his defence. For further discussion please see R. Card and R. 
Ward, (1996) The Criminal Procedure and Investigations Act 1996, (Jordan’s Publishing, Bristol) at p. 37. 
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At the time Hannah Quirk suggested the disclosure provisions were unworkable as the 
provisions were flawed due to three fundamental reasons: (1) the lack of understanding of the 
role and culture of each of the participants, (2) the inadequate allocation of responsibility and 
(3) the insufficient sanctions for non-compliance with the rules that can be imposed fairly on 
defendants.26 Defence statements contained often minuscule amounts of information and 
were generally as vague as possible; they often served as nothing more than a denial of the 
charge. For example, a defence statement completed by the defence in answer to a charge of 
handling a stolen motor vehicle, offered the following response: ‘the accused denies that he 
dishonestly received the vehicle and that he knew or believed that the same was stolen.’27 The 
vagueness of this statement could potentially leave the door open for the defence to spring an 
ambush defence at trial.28 In a study for the RCCJ, which acted as a catalyst for the CPIA, 
Roger Leng suggested that the threat of ambush defences was ‘the single most powerful 
factor in the campaign to abolish the right to silence and to require the early disclosure of the 
defence case.’29 Yet, as Leng’s study for the RCCJ suggested, the idea that disclosure was 
needed to combat ‘ambush defences’30 was misplaced.31 The price for springing the ambush 
was that the defence may miss crucial material not being disclosed at the second stage of 
prosecution disclosure. The statement does not indicate any particular defence that the 
accused will rely on and therefore leaves the prosecution without any suitable guidance as to 
what material would be of use to the defence.  
 
Quirk further suggested that the notion of defence disclosure and the idea of rebalancing the 
system fitted neatly with the philosophy of managerialism32 and the early disclosure of the 
defence case would combat the use of an ‘ambush defence’33 which could frustrate the 
interests of justice. However, in reality, the defence was not problematic for the courts, 
                                                            
26 Hannah Quirk discusses these issues at length in ‘The Significance of Culture in Criminal Procedure Reform: 
Why the Revised Disclosure Scheme Cannot Work’ 10 Evidence and Proof, (2006), 42. 
27 C. Taylor ‘Advance Disclosure: Reflections on the Criminal Procedure and Investigations Act 1996’ (2001) 
40(2) Howard Journal, 114, 117. 
28 However, in light of the Criminal Procedure Rules and the Overriding Objective, the Court explicitly 
prohibits ambush defences. This point will be discussed later in this chapter. 
29 R. Leng, ‘Losing Sight of the Defendant: The Government’s Proposals on Pre-Trial Disclosure’, Crim LR 704 
(1995) at 706.  
30 An Ambush defence is one which surprises the prosecution at trial. The prosecution have no idea what 
evidence the defence will call and is therefore ‘ambushed’ by their tactics.  
31 Supra fn 26.. 
32 H. Quirk, ‘Disclosure: Significance of Culture in Criminal Procedural Reform’ (2006) 10 E&P 42-59 at 56.  
33 An Ambush defence is one which surprises the prosecution at trial. The prosecution have no idea what 
evidence the defence will call and is therefore ‘ambushed’ by their tactics. Whilst this is a pejorative term from 
a defence perspective, the prosecution ought to be prepared for any defence to be presented, it is a commonly 
used term to describe this type of defence.  
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Leng’s study for the RCCJ found that ambush defences were raised in between 2-5% of 
trials; all of which ended in the conviction of the defendant.34 Leng also cites the work of 
Block, Corbett and Peay who observed 100 trials and did not find one single use of an 
ambush defence.35 However, Zander and Henderson’s study found ambush defences were 
raised in 7-10% of trials and half of these ended in a conviction.36  Redmayne suggested that 
the creation of the defence disclosure regime ‘forms part of the shift towards a criminal 
justice system whose prime concerns are efficiency and managerialism.’37 Ultimately, these 
encroachments to adversarialism were a continuation of a toxic political atmosphere 
concerning due process rights of the defendant. It is important to note that this evolution did 
not occur in a vacuum and a number of other changes to criminal procedure occurred in the 
1980s and 1990s. The genesis of change can be traced to the Commission reporting in 1981. 
The Commission was established in the wake of a number of miscarriages of justice that 
blighted the criminal justice landscape in the late 1970s.38 The Commission rejected any 
notion that there should be any curtailment of current provision of the right to silence at both 
the pre-trial and trial stage. In fact, the Commission re-emphasised the importance of the 
advanced disclosure being made to the accused as ‘it might put strong psychological pressure 
on some suspects to answer questions without knowing precisely what was … the evidence 
against them…’39 In fact, the Commission appeared to enhance the due process rights of the 
accused and the recommended proposals that established PACE 1984.Quirk suggests that the 
Act was ‘momentous’ and codified both parties’ rights in relation to stop and search, arrest, 
detention, questioning and charge.40 
 
Then the 1990s saw a succession of successful appeals on the basis of false confessions.41 
These cases ‘exposed a catalogue of wrongdoing in the process of … criminal 
                                                            
34 R. Leng, ‘Losing Sight of the Defendant: The Government’s Proposals on Pre-Trial Disclosure’, Crim LR 704 
(1995) at 706. 
35 Ibid. 
36 M. Zander & P. Henderson, The Crown Court Study, Royal Commission Research Study No. 19 (1993), 
pp.14-15. 
37 M. Redmayne, ‘Process Gains and Values: The Criminal Procedure and Investigations Act 1996’ MLR 60(1) 
1997 79-93 at 93. 
38 See Inquiry into the Circumstances leading to the trial of three persons on charges arising from the death 
of Maxwell Confait (HCP 90) London HMSO 1977. 
39 Ibid para 4.50. 
40 H. Quirk, The Rise and Fall of the Right of Silence, (2017) Routlegde: Oxon) at p.36. 
41 The Birmingham Six (McIkenny and Others [1992] Crim LR 117; Stefan Kiszko (Kiszko 1992); The 
Cardiff Three (Paris, Abdullahi and Miller [1993] 97 Cr App Rep 99; and Judith Ward (R v Ward [1993] 1 
WLR 619 96 Cr App Rep 1) 
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investigation.’42 In response, the government established the Royal Commission on Criminal 
Justice (RCCJ) to examine potential reforms to the criminal justice process. Quirk suggests 
that although the Conservative party of the early 1990s had won a fourth successive General 
Election, they were in fact, rather unpopular.43 As such, a governmental notion of ‘Law and 
Order’ had begun to counter the rising concerns about crime. The then Home Secretary, 
Michael Howard, suggested at the 1993 Conservative Party conference that ‘the right to 
silence will be abolished. The innocent have nothing to fear.’44 This conflation of guilt and 
silence was endemic in both the crime control policies and political atmosphere of the time 
and something that allowed the creation of the defence disclosure regime and breeding 
ground for the CrimPR. 
 
The Rise of the ‘New Regime’ 
Through the Police and Criminal Evidence Act, the late 1980s afford the suspect greater 
protections in the criminal justice system and the 1990s tried to reign in these protections. 
This continued into the 21st Century which saw the acceleration of the of the managerialist 
regime.45 In his Review of the Criminal Courts of England and Wales46 (hereafter the Auld 
Review), Auld LJ said: ‘… fairness, efficiency and effectiveness of the criminal justice 
system demand that its procedure should be simple, accessible and, so far as is practicable the 
same for every type of criminal jurisdiction.’47 He commented that the 1996 Act ‘was not 
working as Parliament intended and its operation did not command the confidence of 
criminal practitioners.’48 Auld also argued that there was a high level of non-compliance by 
the defence in its duty of completing an adequate defence statement; this non-compliance was 
a major deficiency in the disclosure provisions and he believed that the current three-stage 
disclosure process was both ‘logical and fair.’49 
 
                                                            
42 H. Quirk, The Rise and Fall of the Right of Silence, (2017) Routlegde: Oxon) at p.40 
43 Ibid 43. 
44 A. Travers (1993) ‘Right to Silence abolished in crackdown on crime’ Guardian 7 October as cited in at p.44 
45 However it is arguable that the both the Conservative and Labour governments of the 1990s paved the way for 
a crime control agenda with their ‘tough on crime rhetoric’s’  
46 Lord Justice Auld, (2001) Review of the Criminal Courts. 
47 ibid at chapter 10 para 271. 
48 Ibid, Ch 10 para 163 p 463. For an analysis regime’s failings, please see J. Plotnikoff and R. Woolfson, A Fair 
Balance? Evaluation of the Operation of Disclosure Law, Home Office, RDS Occasional Paper No 76 (2001) 
and H. Quirk, The Significance of culture in criminal procedure reform: Why the revised disclosure scheme 
cannot work, The International Journal of Evidence & Proof, 10(1), 42-59.  
49 ibid p.466 para 171. 
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In keeping with the recommendation of the Auld Review, the Criminal Procedure Rules 
Committee was established ‘to create a single and simply expressed instrument’50 that 
codifies criminal procedure. The Rules would govern the practice and procedure to be 
followed in the Criminal Division of the Court of Appeal, the Crown Court and for criminal 
proceedings in magistrates’ courts. Furthermore, the Committee is responsible for the 
development of the necessary procedures to bring about the closer alignment of the criminal 
courts.51 The Rules were created under the authority of s.69 of the Courts Act 2003 and the 
Act explicitly states that they should secure that ‘the criminal justice system is accessible, fair 
and efficient and the rules are simple and simply expressed.’52 Rule 1.1 explicitly states that 
the overriding objective of the new code is that criminal cases should be dealt with justly. 
Rule 1.1(2) provides a non-exhaustive list of what ‘justly’ means.  
 
To assist the courts in satisfying the overriding objective, Part III of the CrimPR created the 
case management provisions, which obligate all actors in the process to help fulfil the 
overriding objective. Whilst the case management provisions are nothing new to the court the 
impact has transformed the role of the judiciary. Prior to the creation of the CrimPR were 
generally perceived as passive, neutral umpires.53 However, that it is no longer the case, the 
judiciary is an active participant in proceedings. The shroud of passivity would be shed with 
the dawn of the new millennium. In Jisl54 Judge LJ highlighted the importance of having an 
active and interventionist judge. Talking about the starting point for any criminal case he 
stated: 
 
The starting point is simple. Justice must be done. The defendant is entitled to a fair 
trial: and, which is sometimes overlooked, the prosecution is equally entitled to a 
reasonable opportunity to present the evidence against the defendant. It is not 
however a concomitant of the entitlement to a fair trial that either or both sides are 
further entitled to take as much time as they like, or for that matter, as long as counsel 
and solicitors or the defendants themselves think appropriate. Resources are limited ... 
time itself is a resource.  
                                                            
50 Supra fn.42 p.472 Para 184. 
51http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/+/http://www.dca.gov.uk/procedurerules/criminalpr_committee.htm 
[Last Accessed March 2019]. 
52 S.69(4)(a) and (b) Courts Act 2003.  
53 See E. Johnston, (2016) All Rise for the Interventionist: The Judiciary in the 21st Century, Journal of Criminal 
Law, 80(3) 201-213.  
54[2004] EWCA Crim 696. 
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In order to conserve resources, the culture of the criminal trial would have to change. Now, 
there would have to be a degree of co-operation between the opposing sides. This was mainly 
achieved by the introduction of a Case Management Form which is effectively compulsory in 
the magistrates’ courts and almost mirror what was required in the CPIA defence case 
statement. Whilst the defence statement was designed to narrow the issues at trial the Case 
Management Forms were designed to ‘identify the real issues’ and make the trial process 
more efficient and expeditious. This seems to run counter the concept of adversarialism. 
Traditionally, a fundamental principle ran through the common law: the defendant has the 
right of silence throughout criminal proceedings and to require the prosecution to prove its 
case. As Viscount Sankey LC stated ‘throughout the web of English Criminal Law one 
golden thread is always to be seen, that it is the duty of the prosecution to prove the 
prisoner’s guilt…’.55 However, not all lawyers are embracing the aforementioned change to 
disclosure: Andrew Keogh claimed that the ‘clever technical lawyer is now officially dead.’56 
Although it is impossible to refute that the courts have adopted a new approach to hearing 
criminal cases57 this position however appears rather extreme. Indeed, to say that the clever 
technical lawyer is dead might not necessarily be the case.  
 
What is the ‘Adversarial Defence Lawyer’ and did they ever exist? 
Before investigating whether the ‘clever technical lawyer’ is indeed dead it is worth 
establishing a theoretical conception of the defence lawyer’s role is. The role can be seen to 
operate on three interwoven levels: firstly, he is the mouthpiece of his client; secondly he is 
an officer of the court; and finally he acts as a zealous protector of the rights of his client.58 
Despite being charged with advancing his client’s case, the defence lawyer’s obligation to his 
client is, at times, tempered by obligations owed to other parties in the criminal justice 
process; this notion was expressed by Lord Reid in the case of Rondel v Worsley:59  
  
                                                            
55 Woolmington v DPP [1935] AC 462 at 481. 
56 Andrew Keogh speaking at the Eldon Lecture Series (2001), Northumbria University School of Law, 
‘Criminal Case Management – Is the Game Over?’ the quote is taken from p.1 of the transcript. The clever 
technical lawyer is one who is zealous in the defence of their client and uses all available tactics to advance the 
client’s best interest.  
57 For example, see R (on the application of the DPP) v Chorley Justices & Anor [2006] EWHC 1795  
per Thomas LJ at para 24. 
58 M. Blake and A. Ashworth, ‘Ethics and the Criminal Defence Lawyer’ [2004] Legal Ethics vol 7 167-190 at 
167.  
59 [1969] 1A.C. 191.  
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‘…Counsel has a duty to fearlessly raise every issue, advance every argument and ask 
every question, however distasteful, which he thinks will help his client’s case. But as 
an officer of the court concerned with the administration of justice, he has an overriding 
duty to the court, to the standards of his profession and to the public, which may and 
often lead to a conflict with his client’s wishes…’.60  
  
It is clear from this statement that the role of the defence lawyer is not as clear-cut as merely 
advancing the case of his client and acting in his best interest. At times, he will be charged 
with actively engaging in ethical decision-making. It has been claimed that the defence 
lawyer operates on the horns of a trilemma: he needs to accumulate as much knowledge 
about the case as possible; to hold it in confidence; and yet to never mislead the courts.61 The 
adversarial criminal process in England and Wales is rooted in the image of the defence 
lawyer acting as the accused’s shield from the powerful state; this notion has in turn 
cultivated the ideal of neutral partisanship becoming a central tenet of the role of the defence 
lawyer.62 This duty of neutral partisanship reflects a dual part of the adversarial ethos; the 
accused is to be adequately protected from the ‘oppressive’ state, and the truth is best 
discovered by arguments on both sides of the question.63 It has been argued that this classic 
view of the adversarial defence lawyer does not exist in reality. McConville’s et al Standing 
Accused64 suggested defence lawyers were not being adversarial defenders of their clients 
and lawyers often held low opinions of their clients. The study was rather scathing of the 
criminal defence profession, stating that lawyers would ‘import their own working 
assumptions about criminal suspects and inclinations toward crime control values.’65 The 
study also found that ‘defence practice [was] seemingly concerned with the efficient 
management and processing of its clients through the ‘machinery of justice’ [rather] than the 
delivery of justice itself.’66 Ultimately, the study found that, overall, defence practitioners 
offered ‘poor quality services which [did] little to uphold the values or principles in our 
                                                            
60 [1969] 1A.C. 191 at 227-28.  
61 M. Blake and A. Ashworth, ‘Ethics and the Criminal Defence Lawyer’ [2004] Legal Ethics vol 7 167-190 at 
173.  
62 ibid 169.  
63 Ex parte Lloyd (1822) Montagu’s Reports 70n, 72 per Lord Eldon.  64 M. McConville, J. Hodgson, L. Bridges and A. Pavlovic, Standing Accused  (1994), Oxford University Press: 
Oxford 
65 ibid p.282.   
66 ibid at p.295.   
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criminal justice system.67 The findings of were classified into four distinct types of law firms: 
The Classic; The Managerial, The Political and The Routine.  
Newman followed the work of McConville et al by categorising different titles for different 
firms. He used the terms ‘radical’ and ‘sausage factory’. A radical firm is a ‘dying breed of 
lawyers who devote themselves to their clients.’68 The ‘sausage factory’ is an example of an 
emergent thread that places profits before clients. The sausage factory is the antithesis of the 
radical firm.69 This firm is more associated with the notion of a passive defence. Newman 
uses the title ‘sausage factory’ because in the food industry the factories are presumed to 
reduce diverse raw materials into uniform, easy to manage and cheap products.961 The study 
was less concerned with how firms work, but with the values, attitudes and perceptions held 
by the individual lawyers within the firms. This study only examined what the lawyers said - 
no observations were undertaken in this particular study. There is a distinct disadvantage in 
only interviewing lawyers as Newman realised when he uncovered significant differences in 
formal interviews when compared with observational research. He found lawyers would 
espouse the view that they stood for active defence and therefore fitted into the ‘radical’ 
category but that they appeared to practice something far more passive and akin to the 
‘sausage factory’.70  
Whilst this study should be mindful of participants providing answers they do not necessarily 
practice, the findings nevertheless hold value, as they present data on how defence lawyers 
perceive their own role in the modern era of criminal defence work. However, this study 
suggested that defence lawyers frequently did speak of themselves in terms of being an 
adversarial protector of defence rights, but these views were often tempered by the 
competing obligations in the case management era of the modern criminal trial.  
However, despite studies suggesting that the adversarial defence lawyer did not exist in 
practice, the importance of the role, at least in academic literature is clear. Steinberg 
suggests  that the lawyer needs to be zealous as this benefits society - the victim, the judge, 
the defendant, witnesses, juror or disinterested bystander - because any one of them can 
switch roles and become a future defendant.71 However, as suggested above, the work of 
                                                            
67 ibid at p.298.   
68 ibid at p.30.  
69 Ibid at p.30.  
70 D. Newman, Legal Aid Lawyers and the Quest for Justice, (2013), Hart: Oxford p.147.  
71 H. B. Stienberg, ‘The Responsibility of the Defense Lawyer in Criminal Cases’ Syracuse Law Review, 
(1960), Vol 12 442. 
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McConville et al suggested that defence lawyers treated their clients with disdain offered 
poor quality services.  
 
The Impact of the Introduction of Case Management Forms on the Work and Role of 
the Defence Lawyer 
The small empirical study was designed to analyse how practising defence lawyers view 
themselves and their role in criminal process. As this paper established, the theoretical 
conception suggested that the lawyer was zealously adversarial in their pursuit of advancing 
the best interest of their client. However, empirical work in the early 1990s and the early part 
of the new millennium painted the lawyer in a rather disappointing light. They were not in 
fact adversarial and often viewed their clients with disdain. This study attempted to analyse if 
the lawyers were adversarial in terms of prioritising the best interest of the client over other 
competing obligations.  
 
It was clear from the interviews was the fact that the ‘clever, technical lawyer’ was not 
actually dead. In order to complete their case management obligations, lawyers would 
frequently take a tactical or technical approach, which provided enough detail to the court but 
tactically, did not reveal their hand completely:  
 
‘I will not disclose his defence ... the form is completed in minimal 
detail. But completing the form causes difficulties because we are 
working from a skeleton. The response is very basic, not very detailed.’ 
[011]. (Partner, 19 years’ experience)  
 
The approach of outlining a skeleton defence, rather than a full defence, in the Case 
Management Form is a problem the courts have faced since the inception of the CPIA 1996.72 
Plotnikoff and Woolfson found that 52 per cent of defence case statements contained a bare 
denial of guilt or did not meet the requirements of S.5 CPIA 1996.73 Furthermore, they 
highlighted that nearly 90 per cent of judges and barristers ‘rarely or never adduce evidence 
                                                                                                                                                                                         
 
72 In Tibbs (The Times, February 28th, 2000) the Court of Appeal stated that is was not suitable to merely use the 
general legal description of the defence i.e. accident or self-defence. The form needs extend to the facts the 
defendant will rely on at trial. 
73 J. Plotnikoff and R. Woolfson, A Fair Balance? Evaluation of the Operation of Disclosure Law, (2001) RDS 
Occasional Paper no 76, at p.77. 
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of the contents of the defence statement at trial, other than to rebut alibi evidence.’74 Quirk 
found that the defence case statements are ‘merely an administrative requirement rather than 
anything of any practical utility’.75  Some of the lawyers interviewed had established a more 
co-operative attitude toward their obligations. They have embraced the era of co-operation 
and do not necessarily adopt a technical approach to completing the Case Management 
Forms. A small minority76 of participants openly embraced the notion of co-operation and 
happily assisted the court by identifying the real issues in the case:  
 
I flag all issues, there is no point springing the issues later as you will be 
criticised by the court … it’s difficult because, I know it’s not a listed 
penalty, but you do not want your client receiving a heftier sentence but 
[I think] it does have that effect sometime. We will not write paragraphs 
we will just say what the ‘nature’ is’. [004] (Solicitor, 8 years’ 
experience). 
 
I do not see this as onerous. What is the point of creating more work for 
everyone when the end point is going to be the same and most likely that 
your client is going to be prejudiced by you trying orchestrate otherwise 
… generally we don’t have too many ‘no comment’ interviews so the 
forms are not telling the CPS anything they don’t know already…’ [005] 
(Solicitor, 5 years’ experience). 
 
It is somewhat surprising that more lawyers did not take this approach especially in light of 
the post-Firth77 decision. If, as Auld LJ stated in Gleeson, the trial is ‘…a search for truth in 
accordance with the twin principles that the prosecution must prove its case and that a 
defendant is not obliged to inculpate themselves’78 then surely the decision in Firth is 
difficult to reconcile with either of those principles and defence lawyers should be mindful of 
it. In Firth, the defence lawyer made an assertion in the case progression form that the 
accused was acting in self-defence which at trial was successfully relied upon by the 
                                                            
74 ibid. 
75 H. Quirk, ‘The Significance of Culture in Criminal Procedure Reform: Why the Revised Disclosure Scheme 
Cannot Work’ (2006) E&P 10(1), 42-59 at 57.  
76 4/24 participants thought the form posed no danger to their client and they were happy to complete the forms.  
77 Firth v Epping Magistrates’ Court[2011] EWHC 388 (Admin), 
78 R v John Vincent Gleeson [2004] 1 Cr App R 29, per Auld LJ at para 36.  
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prosecution arguing that it was an admission of the defendant’s presence at the scene. The 
defence tested the prosecution’s point and quite properly took the point that identification 
could not be established.79 However, the magistrates admitted the Case Management Form as 
evidence of an admission by the defendant that she was present at the scene and struck the 
complainant. In the Divisional Court, Toulson LJ upheld the magistrates’ court decision, 
explaining:   
  
‘It does not infringe against the principle that a defendant is not required 
to incriminate themselves for the court to require that the nature of the 
defence is made plain well before the trial. Of course, any requirement 
for disclosure of the nature of the defence must be a fair requirement, in 
the sense that it must not be extracted from a defendant in circumstances 
where the prosecution has no case …’80  
However, some protection is afforded to the defendant by virtue of R v Newell.81 Here, the 
appellant appealed against a conviction for possession of cocaine with intent to supply. At the 
Plea and Case Management Hearing (PCMH), the appellant did not serve a defence statement 
and when completing the Case Management Form, the lawyer, who did not represent N at 
trial, stated ‘no possession’. On the morning of the trial, and under the instruction of new 
solicitors, a defence statement was served in which he accepted possession of cocaine but 
denied the intent to supply. The CPS sought to cross examine the defendant because there 
were inconsistencies with his case progression form and the defence statement admission. 
The judge allowed the cross-examination. The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding 
that the judge should have excluded the case progression form under s.78 Police and Criminal 
Evidence Act 1984, as the sanction of adverse inferences for the failure to serve the defence 
statement was sufficient.82 This highlights just how careful the lawyer needs to be when 
completing the form in order to not incriminate his client.  
 
                                                            
79 D. Rhodes ‘Life in Crime: The Truth is Out There’, Solictor’s Journal, vol 156, no 19 16th May 2011.   
80 Firth v Epping Magistrates’ Court [2011] EWHC 388 (Admin), per Toulson LJ at para 22 
81 [2012] EWCA Crim 650. 
82 Ibid at para 36.  
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I do not think it’s unreasonable to say to a D we need you to identify what 
your defence is. These are public funds. Because of Newell,83 we do not have 
to be as cautious as one once was.’ [006] (Senior Partner, 40 years’ 
experience).  
 
Another Senior Partner [with 30 years’ experience] held the opinion that the protection 
afforded in Newell was robust enough to withstand any tactical use by the prosecution. 
Nevertheless, the lawyer adopted a very cautious approach to completing the forms:  
 
‘I complete the forms with great care. Although, the higher courts have 
said the forms would not be used against a defendant84… but someone 
will always raise it in my view… We basically need a full picture [of 
evidence]. That isn’t happening. We have to make progress, but we have 
1/3 of evidence yet have to advise the client. If he is pleading not guilty, 
we have to complete the Case Management Form. It has to be done very 
carefully; it could undermine his position at trial.’ 
 
The completion of the case progression form is inescapable and the Case Management Forms 
are analogous to the defence statement served under s.5 CPIA 1996. Rhodes suggests that 
whilst there are no adverse inferences for failure to complete the case progression form, 
perhaps the lawyer should write on the form ‘the issue at trial is whether the prosecution can 
prove its case, I am not instructed to make any factual admissions until after the prosecution 
has complied with its duty of disclosure.’85 However, it is hard to imagine a court accepting 
such a small level of detail, as one of the participants explained:  
the magistrates say “[your client] should complete the form because he 
knows if he’s done it” [committed the offence]. That’s wrong. It shows a 
fundamental misunderstanding of the law and it’s a deliberate 
manipulation.’ [002] (Senior Partner, 32 years’ experience).  
                                                            
83 The protection afforded by Newell [2012] EWCA Crim 650 is welcomed but it can be viewed as somewhat 
opaque. The court decided the Crown could not use a statement made in a PCMH to prove the defendant’s 
evidence at trial was inconsistent with the completed form. The prosecution could not use the statement to the 
detriment of the appellant. This would be unfair to the defence. However, if the spirit of the Rules is not 
complied with the court may allow such evidence to be admitted at trial (per Sir Anthony May P at para 37. 
84 As per Newell [2012] EWCA Crim 650. 
85 D. Rhodes ‘Life in Crime: The Truth is Out There’, Solicitor’s Journal, vol 156, no 19 16th May 2011.  
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Despite the protection afforded by Newell86 Lord Justice Gross and Lord Justice Treacy 
suggested that as a sanction for non-compliance with the CrimPR, the prosecution should be 
able to use what completed forms they have as evidence. They stated: ‘We see no reason why 
a defence statement should not be capable of forming part of the prosecution’s case … since 
the statement is deemed to be made with the defendant’s authority it is thus akin to comments 
he makes in an interview’.87 Whilst this point concerns the defence statement, if the Case 
Management Form has been deemed to be ‘analogous to the defence case statement’88 any 
repercussions may present a similar danger to lawyers. Rochford89 suggests it is not a 
Contempt of Court to not file a defence statement and Anthony Edwards suggests that the 
defendant is entitled to hold back the information provided the defendant is prepared to take 
the risk an inference being drawn.90 However, a basic completion of the form is now viewed 
rather dimly by the courts as ‘the client knows if he has done it.’ As such, it creates a 
normative expectation that the forms will be completed fully, containing extensive detail.91 
This provides a difficulty for the lawyers. On one hand, the courts are pressing to ensure the 
form is completed adequately and yet they may not have received full disclosure from the 
prosecution, rendering it very difficult to offer clear and comprehensive legal advice.  
 
Active Case Management and Early Guilty Pleas  
This constant drive for efficiency creates tensions for the lawyers. Some lawyers stated that 
they feel it is difficult to provide adequate legal advice as a plea has to be entered and the 
case fully managed at the first hearing, irrespective of prosecution disclosure or access to 
legal advice. The CrimPR dictates that the advocates must assist the court with their Active 
Case Management responsibilities,92 and the circumvention of the voluntary nature of the 
Defence Case Statement (via the Case Management Forms) is analogous to the CPIA 1996 
provisions.  
                                                            
86 Newell [2012] EWCA Crim 650 
87 Rt. Hon Lord Justice Gross and Rt Hon Lord Justice Treacy, Further Review of Disclosure in Criminal 
Proceedings, (Judiciary of England and Wales, 2012). 
88 Andrew Keogh speaking at the Eldon Lecture Series (2001), Northumbria University School of Law, 
‘Criminal Case Management – Is the Game Over?’ the quote is taken from p.1 of the transcript. 
89 [2010] EWCA Crim 1928. 
90 S.11 Criminal Procedure and Investigations Act 1996, See also, J McEwan 'From Adversarialism To 
Managerialism: Criminal Justice In Transition', year? Legal Studies, vol. 31, no. 3, at p.528  which  states trial 
judges seem reluctant to discipline the defence through measures such as adverse inferences which penalise the 
defendant.  
91 R v Writtle [2009] EWHC 236 and R v Bryant [2005] EWCA Crim 2079. 
92 CrimPR Rule 3.2. 
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These requirements are further assisted by the shift in judicial culture. In the Chorley 
Justices93 case Thomas LJ indicated that if the ‘defendant refuses to identify what the issues 
are… he can derive no advantage from that or seek… to attempt an ambush at trial. The days 
of ambushing and taking last minute technical defences are gone’. In order to assist the court 
with its active case management, both sides have to complete a case management form, 
which includes, inter alia, the identification of the real issues, and which enables the 
monitoring and progressing of the case. In 2015 it was found that there was ‘undoubted room 
for improvement’94 in the sphere of case management. Sir Brian Leveson’s Review of 
Efficiency in Criminal Proceedings95 found that all parties needed to work to ‘identify the 
issues so as to ensure that court time is deployed to maximum effectiveness and efficiency’.96 
With this Review the goals of efficiency and effectiveness were further consolidated with the 
genesis of the Better Case Management Initiative (hereafter, BCM)97  which links a number 
of initiatives aimed to increase the efficiency with which cases are processed through the 
criminal justice system. The overarching aims of BCM are as follows:  
 
● Robust case management; 
● Reduced number of hearings;  
● Maximum participation and engagement with every participant within the system and; 
● Efficient compliance with the CrimPR, Practice and Court Directions.98 
On the first anniversary of the initiatives implementation the Judiciary of England and Wales 
suggested the programme had been a success with ‘data showing some positive indications, 
such as a reduction of hearings prior to disposal.’99 To further assist in fulfilling these goals, 
BCM introduced a new case management initiative, the uniform Early Guilty Plea Scheme. 
                                                            
93 [2006] EWHC 1795 (Admin). 
94 Gross LJ, Review of Disclosure in Criminal Proceedings, Judiciary of England and Wales at 76. year? 
95 Sir Brain Leveson, Review of Efficiency in Criminal Proceedings (London, Judiciary of England and Wales, 
2015) https://www.judiciary.gov.uk/wp-content/uploads/2015/01/review-of-efficiency-in-criminal-proceedings-
20151.pdf.   
96 ibid at p.12. 
97 Courts and Tribunals Judiciary, Better Case Management available at 
www.judiciary.gov.uk/publications/better-case-management  
98 See Better Case Management Information Pack (2015) available here: https://www.judiciary.uk/wp-
content/uploads/2015/09/better-case-management-information-pack-3.pdf [Last accessed January 2019].  
99 https://www.judiciary.uk/wp-content/uploads/2016/10/bcm-newsletter-issue-11.pdf [last accessed June 2019]. 
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The CPS state that obtaining a guilty plea at the earliest opportunity has ‘huge advantages,’100 
one being efficiency, as the police, court and prosecution will make economic savings. There 
is a benefit to a defendant entering an early guilty plea - should they do so, they will be 
entitled to a sentence discount.101 The concept of the Early Guilty Plea scheme is not, in 
itself, an offensive one. Where a case is straightforward, a defendant accepts their guilt and 
the evidence is substantial and undisputed, it seems justifiable to encourage a guilty plea at 
the initial stages; so long as the circumstances of the defendant do not negate his free and 
informed choice. In circumstances where these conditions are not met, the scheme poses 
problems. The scheme states that the discount are not a reward but an incentive, but this is 
arguably a matter of semantics rather than substance.102 In reality, a defendant may view the 
discount as neither a reward for ‘doing the right thing’ nor an incentive to assist those 
prosecuting them. However, it could be viewed as a temptation to reduce the risk of 
conviction for an offence the defendant has not committed or an inducement to sacrifice their 
legitimate fair trial rights. Rights such as the privilege against self-incrimination and the fact 
it is the duty of the prosecution to discharge the burden of proof.   
 
There is a clear problem between insufficient disclosure and the pressure to enter a plea at the 
earliest opportunity. Some lawyers interviewed expressed great dismay about entering a plea 
and disclosing the real issues at the earliest opportunity, whilst not necessarily knowing what 
evidence was already in the possession of the prosecution.103 Often the lawyers would only 
be meeting their client on the morning of trial and they sometimes had to complete the Case 
Management Forms within twenty or thirty minutes of meeting the defendant. A difficulty 
emerges because of the potential loss of sentence discount for a guilty plea. McEwan states 
that prosecution evidence is frequently not available at the first instance.104 In Lawyer 002’s 
words, 
 
                                                            
100 See paragraph 3: 
http://www.cps.gov.uk/southwest/cps_southwest_news/news_articles/in_the_dock_early_guilty_plea_scheme_s
peeds_up_justice_for_victims/ 
101 Depending on what stage of proceedings the plea is tendered, the maximum sentence discount is one-third. 
See, Sentencing Council, Reduction in Sentence for Early Guilty Plea: Definitive Guideline, available here: 
https://www.sentencingcouncil.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/Reduction-in-Sentence-for-Guilty-plea-Definitive-
Guide_FINAL_WEB.pdf [last accessed March 2019]. 
102 See, E. Johnston, ‘The Early Guilty Plea: The Need for Adequate Disclosure’, (2016) Criminal Law and 
Justice Weekly, 180 JPN 269. 
103 This was not universal but 20/24 interviewed participants highlighted this as a concern. 
104 J. McEwan, 'Truth Efficiency and Co-operation in modern Criminal Justice’, (2013), Current Legal 
Problems, 66, 216. 
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‘A fundamental problem with these forms is that you are expected to fill 
them in on the first occasion which is often when you have been given 
the evidence for the first time and had an opportunity to speak to the 
client for the first time. You are in court; it is not the appropriate 
environment so solicitors should be saying “I want an adjournment; I 
don’t want to deal with case management issues today” but the courts 
don’t really allow that.  So, the solicitor then has to decide - am I going to 
push ahead anyway notwithstanding and make sure I get it right or am I 
going to advise the client that I don’t feel in a position to properly 
represent you today and withdraw from the case.’ [021] (Solicitor, 12 
years’ experience).  
 
As Lawyer 003 (Solicitor, 7 years’ experience) stated ‘[the speed creates great difficulty] 
you’re making decisions with only a partial picture [of facts].’ Another Lawyer (Senior 
Partner, 30 years’ experience) gave an example that highlighted the inherent dangers of 
advising a client without a full picture of the facts. The lawyer highlighted that the culture 
change is not just about the notion of co-operation; there has been a change in culture from 
the judiciary and magistrates as well. When complaining to a judge that he could not 
adequately advise their client owing to a lack of information, the judge retorted quickly, 
‘well, your client knows if he’s done it’. What muddies the water further is the fact the 
defendant might not know he is guilty, a view that was not always accepted by magistrates. 
Four lawyers commented that they had heard magistrates proclaim words to the effect of 
‘your client knows if he’s done it or not’.105 Lawyer 006 (Senior Partner, 40 years’ 
experience) intimated that this approach is ‘pretty much universal’ in his/her region. These 
research findings corroborate Edwards’ suggestion of aggressive judicial behaviour regarding 
the completion of statements: the judges and magistrates have evolved a long way from their 
original purpose of assisting in the identification of relevant material for further prosecution 
evidence.106 
 
Furthermore, any guilty plea should be grounded in sound legal advice based on the weight of 
evidence the prosecution holds. However, the interviews point out that pre-trial disclosure by 
                                                            
105 Although this was not an explicit question on the pro forma four lawyers, from three different firms, in three 
different regions of England and Wales suggested that they have either encountered such a question of a 
magistrate.  
106 A. Edwards ‘Case Management Forms’ CLR 2011 54. 
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the CPS is often inadequate in practice and this poses great difficulty for defence lawyers. All 
24 lawyers commented that the prosecution does not adhere to the disclosure regime and is 
effectively left unchecked. In contrast, when the defence does not adhere to the regime, the 
defendants and their lawyer are frequently threatened with sanction by the court. This 
disparity in treatment is rather concerning and has serious consequences. One may 
legitimately ask why the defence are consistently threatened with the stick and the 
prosecution are not given the same treatment. At present, there is little regulation of 
disclosure prior to the first hearing and this lack of regulation is important as it is the only 
point at which a defendant would be eligible for the maximum discount. The prosecution is 
only required to disclose Initial Details of the Prosecution Case (IDPC) if the defence 
requests it (Rule 8.2(2)). The scope of this disclosure is narrow (particularly for defendants 
brought to court in custody): prosecutors are mandated to share details of circumstances of 
the offence and the criminal record of the defendant, and little else. This poses a very serious 
question: how are defence lawyers expected to give sound legal advice as to plea when they 
are only advising on a partial picture of the evidence. 
  
If entering an early guilty plea falls under ‘robust case management’ it is difficult to see a 
lawyer being able to adequately advise on plea with such little information. Arguably, the 
overriding objective could be viewed as a management tool in a system that assumes guilt 
and wants to process guilty cases. The assumption of guilt is something that is deeply non-
adversarial and if the assumption is true, it reduces the due process protections of the 
adversarial process. Traditional theory holds that the truth emerges where two sides present 
their own version of events and are pitted against each other on equal terms.107 However, in 
the 21st Century there is a distinct lack of a level footing. Disclosure was designed to even out 
the equality of arms between the prosecution and defence.108 By completing the case 
management forms, there is an inherent danger of making an incriminating admission which 
the prosecution could try and use against the defendant.109 Lord Sankey classed the 
presumption of innocence as the golden thread; it is one that is unbreakable,110 perhaps the 
pursuit of efficiency has broken this. 
 
                                                            
107 J. Jackson ‘Towards a Dialectic Theory of Proof for Legal Procedure (1991) 154 JR Stat Soc 107. 
108 CITE 
109 See Firth v Epping Magistrates Court [2011] EWHC 388 (Admin). 
110 Per Lord Sankey in Woolmington v DPP [1935] AC 462 at 481. 
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Pressure to Enter a Guilty Plea 
The disclosure has attempted to make trials more efficient, if each side knows the arguments 
of the other, there should be a less of a time-consuming battle. However, the process has 
attempted to become even more swift by reducing the number of cases that get to the trial 
stage by offering inducements to plead guilty at the earliest possible stage. The Sentencing 
Council offered guidance that the maximum sentence discount for an early guilty plea would 
be one-third off the defendant’s sentence.111 There are however stark dangers in being 
pressured to enter a guilty plea are stark and were demonstrated in the case of R v (on the 
application of the DPP) v Leicester Magistrates’ Court.112 The claimant applied for judicial 
review to re-open his conviction for common assault. The offence had allegedly been 
committed against a 14-year-old boy, in the care of the defendant as an agency worker in a 
care home. At his first appearance in court, he intended to enter a not guilty plea on the basis 
of self-defence. However, he changed this on the first day of his trial. He asserted that his 
solicitor had pressured them into entering an early guilty plea; he was convicted, and, as a 
result, was no longer able to find work in the social care sector. Whilst the magistrates’ court 
can make an order to re-open a conviction when it is in the interests of justice (under s.142 
Magistrates’ Courts Act 1980) it can only be exercised where there has been a mistake or a 
situation akin to a mistake. A subsequent change of heart or regret at entering a guilty plea 
will not suffice as a mistake and as such the defendant’s conviction was confirmed. This is 
arguably a matter of interpretation. One could feasibly argue that ‘regret’ over changing a 
plea due to inappropriate pressure from lawyers is tantamount to a mistake. Clearly, the 
defendant’s first inclination was to plead not guilty, but he was persuaded to plead otherwise. 
In the same way that false confessions are subsequently considered to be mistaken when 
extracted under police pressure, there seems no logical reason why a ‘change of heart’ about 
a guilty plea in such circumstances should be considered any differently. In contrast, where a 
defendant pleads guilty and has a vague or ill-defined ‘regret’ based on nothing more than the 
desire to avoid conviction, it seems more reasonable to prevent the overturning of 
convictions.  
 
                                                            
111 Sentencing Council, (2017) Reduction in Sentence for a Guilty Plea: Definitive Guidance at p.5 available 
here: https://www.sentencingcouncil.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/Reduction-in-Sentence-for-Guilty-Plea-
definitive-guideline-SC-Web.pdf [Last accessed March 2019].  
112 (Unreported, 9th February 2016). 
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Newman painted a rather bleak picture of what he witnessed in terms of lawyer-client 
interactions.113 In fact most lawyers whom he observed held a presumption of guilt in respect 
of their clients; the lawyer ‘assumed’ the client would enter a plea of guilty and the lawyer 
helped facilitate such a plea,114 even when the client wanted to enter a not guilty plea.115 
None of the participants interviewed for this study suggested that they would pressurise a 
client to enter a plea which suited their own needs for quick pleas. However, Leicester 
magistrates’116 suggests that undue pressure may not only come from the judiciary but from 
the client’s own lawyer.  
 
The Legal Aid Cuts and the Pressure to Plead Guilty 
As illustrated in the Leicester Magistrates case above. The pressure to enter an early guilty 
plea may not only come from the court and the CrimPR but also from the client’s own 
lawyer. It is well known that the Legal Aid budget has seen a number of drastic cuts over the 
last thirty years. In short, the fees paid to Legal Aid lawyers have been frozen for decades and 
successive governments have attempted to reduce the cost of the legal aid budget through a 
number of cuts and reforms. Legal Aid remuneration is so poor that lawyers are criminal 
lawyers have voted to strike in a protest against low-fees. The Guardian reports that some 
lawyers are paid as a little as £46.50 for a day in court.117 The Criminal Bar Association of 
England and Wales are looking to raise the minimum fee from £46.50 to £100.00 and to 
increase the fees for examining evidence released through disclosure. With such low fees 
available for work, it is hardly surprising that some lawyers might help facilitate an early 
guilty plea from the client. 
Active case management and an Early Guilty Plea stands at odds to the due process nature of 
the adversarial criminal procedure, coupled with the low fees of defence representation it is 
no surprise to see cases dealt with an expediated manner. However, the speed in which cases 
are dealt with sits at odds with traditional adversarial systems, which are focused on the 
protecting the fair trial rights of the defendant.118 The goal of active case management and the 
guilty plea is to undoubtedly increase the efficiency of the criminal process. In Herbert 
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Packer’s Due Process Model (DPM), a central component of the adversary process is the 
accused’s opportunity to have ‘his day in court’, should he elect to do so and have the 
evidence against them tested by his defence lawyer.119 The model looks much like an 
obstacle course with each successive stage designed to present formidable impediments to 
carrying the accused any further through the process.120 Packer’s opposing model, the Crime 
Control Model (CCM) is almost managerial in nature. The metaphor used by Packer was a 
conveyor belt, moving an endless stream of cases smoothly through the system, never 
stopping. Traditional trial elements such as cross-examination have no real value in this 
model; facts are more easily established at the police station and the procedures followed 
need to be uniform. Furthermore, the earlier a case can be disposed of, the better.121 
Arguably, the case management and guilty plea system reflects the conveyor belt approach 
suggested by Packer and encourages the defendant to forgo ‘his day in court.’  
Disclosure Failings: Inadequate Sanctions for the Prosecution 
The pressure to enter a plea is often given in circumstances where the defence lawyer is not 
in full possession of the relevant evidence and so timely disclosure by the prosecution would 
vastly improve the legal advice offered by the defence. However, there is no suitable stick 
that the court can level at the prosecution, should they fail to disclose evidence in a timely 
manner.  
In contrast, should the defence fail to comply with the disclosure provisions under the CPIA 
1996, the court is permitted to make adverse comment and/or to draw adverse inferences. 
Section 39 CJA 2003 inserted an amended s.11 into the CPIA 1996. The statutory sanction 
available to the court for disclosure faults is that of drawing inferences. Should the accused 
fail to provide the defence statement,122 provides one outside the prescribed time limits,123 
fails to give any updated version of the statement required by s.6B CPIA 1996,124 gives the 
updated statement outside of the prescribed time period125 or sets out inconsistent defences in 
his statement, then the court will make such comment that appears appropriate,126 or the court 
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or jury may draw such inferences as appear proper in deciding whether the accused is guilty 
of the offence concerned.127  
Whilst the inadequacy of judicial sanctions has been well debated. Auld LJ noted the problem 
of creating an enforcement mechanism for compliance with case management orders or other 
procedural orders. Auld stated that ‘[He had] anxiously searched here [in England and Wales] 
and abroad for just and efficient sanctions and incentives to encourage better preparation for 
trial … we are not alone in this search and that, as to sanctions at any rate, it is largely in 
vain.’128 It appears clear that the court does have the power to sanction defence failings. Rule 
3.5(2) states that should a party fail to comply with a rule of direction, the court may fix, 
postpone, bring forward, extend, cancel or adjourn a hearing.129 The court has the power to 
make a costs order130 or the court can impose any sanction as may be appropriate.131 The final 
provision appears to give the court a great deal of latitude in administering and ensuring an 
effective enforcement mechanism. However, with no statutory weight behind the rules, it is 
difficult to envisage anything other than the court administering a financial penalty in respect 
of costs being ordered. This sanction was the one that concerned the majority of lawyers in 
the study:  
 
‘The threat of wasted costs hangs over everything. Just very much the 
fact that if you get something wrong at the early stage and your client 
says, why can’t that evidence go in and it is because you have cocked up 
early on, I think the worry that you are going to have to apply for an 
adjournment and might be refused or an application might be refused 
does play on my mind actually at the case management stage’. [003] 
(Solicitor, 7 years’ experience). 
 
Although costs seem the most likely enforcement mechanism for breaching the rules, Auld LJ 
did highlight the difficulty of using such tools. He believed that orders of costs, wasted costs 
orders, the drawing of adverse inferences or depriving one side or the other of the opportunity 
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of advancing an aspect or all of their case, are not ‘apt ways of encouraging and enforcing 
compliance with criminal pre-trial procedures.’132  
 
There are a number of enforcement mechanisms that are available to the court. However, 
their application is fraught with difficulty. A direction to draw adverse comment for 
breaching the disclosure provisions only affects the defendant and at times the defence 
lawyer may have difficulty in obtaining instructions from his/her client. Furthermore, Denyer 
indicates that courts are unlikely to allow adverse comment for late disclosure unless it was 
‘very very late indeed.’133 Furthermore, it is not appropriate to draw inferences should the 
fault lie with the lawyer. Costs orders against the defendant are unlikely: firstly, owing to his 
lack of means; secondly, as Auld LJ stated, it is difficult to establish who was at fault. Wasted 
costs could be imposed on the lawyer, but again the difficulty is found in establishing who 
was at fault. The courts could refuse to grant an adjournment or allow certain evidence to be 
adduced. These provisions would surely undermine the overriding objective of dealing with 
cases justly. However, in terms of issuing Wasted Costs against the prosecution, the notion is 
rather unlikely as it will be a case of simply moving money from one public purse to another.  
 
However, the need for an adequate sanction for prosecution failings is stark. The Justice Gap 
reports that the number of rape prosecutions in England and Wales that has collapsed because 
of a failure by the prosecution and police to disclose evidence has risen by 70% in the last 
two years.134 However, no evidence exists regarding what sanctions, if any, the court make 
against the prosecution, should the case not collapse. Furthermore, should the prosecution fail 
to comply with its disclosure obligations, the case may not automatically be stayed. In Salt135 
the court suggested that despite the ‘reprehensible conduct of the CPS and police,’ the gravity 
of the charges were so severe that there was a strong public interest in the offences being 
tried; despite the untimely disclosure, a fair trial was still possible. Further, R v R136suggests 
that any untimely disclosure could be remedied by a reduction at the sentencing stage rather 
than allowing a stay. The approach adopted by the court in both Salt and R suggests that a 
stay of proceedings will be the absolute last resort and the court will tolerate failures unless 
they are so untoward that they render the process unfair. 
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In light of the collapsed Allan137 case, the Metropolitan Police made a series of 
recommendations in order to counter any future miscarriage of justices. The force suggested 
it was ‘unfortunate that one prosecutor had the responsibility for this case…’138 and 
suggested that a ‘Disclosure Champion’ should be appointed for ‘Complex Casework’.139 
After an analysis of the available sanctions, it appears there is not one ‘fix-all’ sanction that 
the court can apply and therein lies the difficulty faced by the courts and points that reform is 
urgently required as the aforementioned sanctions only relate to defence failings with the 
disclosure regime, there are no appropriate sanctions to prosecutorial failures and the recent 
collapsed cases of Liam Allan, Isaac Itiary, Samson Makele and Oliver Mears140 suggest that 
prosecution failure may not be rare. However, as highlighted above, there is a distinct need 
for an adequate sanction for disclosure failings, although a suitable one is yet to be identified.  
 
The Role(s) of the Defence Lawyer in the CrimPR Era  
This article has charted the fundamental change in the pre-trial process. The adversarial 
environment has been replaced with an environment of co-operation, where the defence 
discloses a vast array of information in advance of trial and effectively show their cards to 
the prosecution which, to some extent, has better cards as it is difficult to force them to 
disclose information in a timely manner. McConville and Marsh argue that lawyers have 
misread the extent to which their duty to the client has been overridden in the cause of 
efficient court administration.141 This misreading has led to a fundamental departure from 
adversarial values and has given rise to lawyers who either, a) claim to be adversarial but 
illustrate elements of conflict, or b) prioritise the managerial goals of the CrimPR ahead of 
their client’s interest this contention is supported by the small study conducted for this paper. 
The study found that there has been a distinct change in adversarial culture. This culture shift 
has the potential to impact on the role of the defence lawyer; a thematic coding of the 
empirical research gave rise to three types of criminal defence lawyer that practice in the 
post-CrimPR era:  
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The Classic Adversarial Lawyer (4/24 participants)  
The Conflicted Adversarial Lawyer (17/24 participants) and; 
The Procedural Lawyer (3/24 participants).  
The Classic Adversarial Lawyer is a lawyer who is fundamentally clear on which obligations 
compete for priority. He is single-minded and believes that the duty to the client is prioritised 
over any other duty. In this empirical study, only four of the twenty-four interviewed lawyers 
could be described as coming within this category. Lawyer 007 [Senior Partner, 21 years’ 
experience] was an example of the Classic category and was steadfast in explaining his 
duties: ‘I’ll ignore what it says in the Procedure Rules, we are there to protect the legal 
interest of the client.’ The lawyer effectively excludes all other duties in order to advance the 
best interests of his client. Lawyer 006 [Senior Partner, 40 years’ experience] was another 
who explicitly prioritised the duty to the client. The lawyer suggested that having competing 
duties ‘fudged’ the issue; the single duty taking priority is to the client. The four Classic 
Adversarial Lawyers had a combined one hundred and twenty-three years of criminal 
defence experience. They all qualified and practised in the pre-CPIA 1996 era and therefore 
had experience of working in a time before the defence had to disclose any information, save 
for alibi and expert evidence. They had the adversarial weapon of an ambush defence and 
they could put the prosecution to proof without making an affirmative defence. The very 
notion of co-operation between the opposing sides would be shunned; prosecution and 
defence lawyers were adversaries, battling to advance the best interest of their respective 
clients. It is perhaps unsurprising to discover that the category most akin to the classic 
conception of the adversarial lawyer contains the fewest number of participants.142   
As illustrated above, the vast majority of the lawyers in the present study fell into the second 
category, the Conflicted Adversarial Lawyer. Fifteen of the twenty-four participants could be 
placed in this category. They are ‘conflicted’ because they want to prioritise their duty to the 
client but, for a number of reasons, the impact of doing so is greatly diluted. The lawyers use 
terms such as ‘paramount,’ ‘prime’ or ‘main.’ These terms suggest that the duty to the client 
takes priority, but it is quickly given a caveat that other obligations also exist that requires a 
great deal of attention. Lawyer 008 [solicitor 6 years’ experience] provides an illustration of 
the Conflicted Lawyer. The lawyer suggested that their duty was ‘mainly’ to the client; this 
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was not as explicit the Classic Lawyers as it recognised the existence, and importance, of 
other duties. Lawyer 009 [Senior Partner 29 years’ experience] felt that the duty to the client 
was ‘paramount’ but accepted it was ‘coloured’ by the professional obligations to the court. 
These lawyers gave the impression that they are zealous advocates who are the shield of the 
accused, but, unfortunately, their other obligations dilute the impact of this shield. Lawyers in 
this category have a vast amount of experience; the most experienced lawyer qualified thirty-
two years ago whereas the most recently qualified lawyer has four years’ experience. The 
experience range of this group makes for some very interesting results when compared with 
the Procedural category.  
The final category is the Procedural Lawyer, who ultimately sees no issue or conflict with 
the obligations placed upon the defence lawyer by the CPIA and the CrimPR. Lawyer 022 
[solicitor, 6 years’ experience] illustrated this point by explaining the obligations were 
merely an ‘occupational hazard’. These lawyers placed a heavy emphasis on the notion of co-
operation; Lawyer 023 [Solicitor, 7 years’ experience] admitted they had an explicit duty to 
‘their opponents’. Perhaps unsurprisingly, two of the three lawyers in this category had less 
than ten years’ experience; therefore, they have only practiced in an era when the CPIA and 
the CrimPR have been in operation. What was surprising was the remaining two lawyers who 
had thirteen- and eighteen-years’ experience respectively. These advocates did not think the 
CrimPR or CPIA 1996 held many ramifications for the role of the defence lawyer. What is 
interesting is that the most recently qualified lawyers who took part in the study, both of 
whom had four years’ experience, provided responses that put them in the ‘Conflicted’ 
category. Two of the three Procedural lawyers have less than ten years’ experience and 
because they may have been socialised into an era that prioritises efficiency and cooperation, 
it might be expected that the most recently qualified lawyers would also occupy a space in 
the Procedural category but that is not necessarily the case as the two most recently qualified 
lawyers were placed in the ‘conflicted’ category. However, the most senior partner at their 
firms were both in the Classic category and the adversarial culture that permeates those firms 
may have an impact on how they view their role and obligations.  
 
Recommendations: The Future of Disclosure  
This article has established that a combination of the disclosure regime and change in judicial 
culture has led to the dilution of the adversarial process and ultimately renders the defence 
lawyer as a cog in the criminal justice machine; a stark difference to the gladiator of the 
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accused. Further, it highlights the discrepancy of disclosure practices between defendant 
lawyers and the prosecution. Whilst admittedly some lawyers disclose bare minimal detail 
concerning their defence the real problem is the prosecution disclosure: it is incomplete, not 
forthcoming or it is served at a late stage. Unfortunately, there appears to be no suitable 
sanction for such failings and the failings represent a real threat of allowing a miscarriage of 
justice occurring. Arguably, a complete overhaul of the disclosure regime should be made. A 
radical re-design of the regime, as suggested by Smith and Johnston,143 is no doubt 
warranted. Smith and Johnston offer two new ways to tackle the problems with disclosure.  
 
Firstly, ‘full disclosure’, i.e. the entire prosecution case, save for sensitive material, should be 
made to the defence. The authors accept that this may leave the defence with an ‘over-load of 
haystacks, and few tools for finding needles.’144 Secondly, the post of a Judicial Disclosure 
Officer could be created. There are clear resourcing requirements but this approach of 
plugging the issues of a broken regime with piecemeal changes needs to stop. A more 
assertive change is required and the JDO would focus on:  
• Determining what, if any, exculpatory evidence exists; 
• Determining what is non-disclosable on the basis of irrelevance; 
• Withholding sensitive material; and 
• Continuing with this duty for the life of the case.  
 
Smith and Johnston contend that this will create an entirely new figure into the criminal 
justice system and may draw parallels with the investigative judge of inquisitorial 
jurisdictions. They advance that this has the ‘most potential’ to ensure the long-term fairness 
of the process. This would reassert the classic disclosure position, of balancing the quality of 
arms. Instead of the defence showing their cards to the prosecution and allowing them to plug 
gaps in their case, this would re-establish Denning’s ‘spirit’ of the disclosure regime.145 
However, this approach is unlikely in light of the current economic climate, even if the 
improvements would save money in the longer term. 
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Truth or Proof: The Dilution of the Adversarialism in Pursuit of the Overriding 
Objective 
This paper has illustrated a clear desire that the criminal justice process needs to be more 
efficient; this was a clear goal of the CrimPR and its overriding objective. The mechanisms of 
disclosure and case management provisions are the enabling factors that allow the court to 
pursue the objective of a more efficient trial. Undoubtedly, the criminal trial has always 
evolved through time and to preserve resources is not to be immediate derided, however the 
cost of this pursuit could be viewed as something mirroring 18th Century trial process. The 
amount of disclosure and participation forced upon the accused is rendering them akin to the 
‘informational resource’ of the ‘accused speaks’ trials. This form of trial reflected the notion 
that the trial was designed to establish the truth of a particular accusation. The 
implementation of the CrimPR, alongside the judiciary assuming a more interventionist role, 
could suggest that the pendulum is moving toward re-establishing the importance of the truth 
in criminal trials as opposed to proof. The goal of the criminal trial is to reconstruct historical 
events in respect of which neither party is in possession of all the facts.146 Mosidis believes it 
is the problem of fact possession that reveals the tension between truth and proof in a 
criminal trial. He states that the essence of a criminal trial is a search for the truth rather than 
a sporting contest between the prosecution and defence.147 It is this sporting contest that the 
CrimPR has assisted in eradicating. The criminal trial of England and Wales arguably  
reflects some of the values contained within the ‘Accused Speaks’ trial, where the defendant 
is an informational resource of the court148 as the defendant ‘knew if he did it.’ The modern-
day informational resource is forced to identity the ‘real issues’ of his case. Should the 
defendant delay, the court will exert pressure in order to extract a plea; even if the defence 
lawyer does not hold all the facts. The truth-seeking nature of the trial is also exemplified by 
the case management provisions of the CrimPR and its extension, BCM which is designed to 
ensure that the case management provisions are strictly adhered to. Never before has the 
judiciary or magistracy had such explicit directions as to what constitutes their role of active 
case management. Furthermore, the voluntary nature of the defendant’s participation has 
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dissipated and he is effectively compelled to make disclosures in ‘pursuit of efficient fact-
finding’.149 
 
There has been no official recognition that adversarialism ought to be abandoned. However, 
this has been suggested implicitly through piecemeal changes to the criminal justice process. 
The interventionist judiciary and the disclosure regime are forcing the accused to talk by 
having them ‘identify the real issues’ at an early stage. The culture shift does not represent a 
swing toward inquisitorialism. Instead the swing is toward managerialism, and at the heart of 
this shift is the interventionist judge who is not merely a guiding pilot.150 The pendulum has 
swung, and the judiciary is now also the controller of the trial process. With the adversarial 
landscape shifting, the role the actors play also changes. What has not yet been recognised 
but has been highlighted in this article is the impact the managerial agenda has on the role of 
the defence lawyer.  
Conclusion 
Although the CrimPR has ‘an upside in that they consolidated many procedural rules, they 
also have a sinister downside by putting the acquittal of the innocent and conviction of the 
guilty at the heart of the Rules.’151 The Rules ultimately confuse procedure with outcome and 
fundamentally undermine adversarial criminal process. The sole objective of the process 
should be to provide a fair means to trying a criminal charge but as it is at the moment it 
leaves the defence lawyer in a position of great tension: how does one balance the duty to the 
client against the duty to the court?   
Andrew Keogh intimated that the ‘clever, technical lawyer had died.’152 However, the 
empirical interviews suggest that is not necessarily the case. The clever technical lawyer, 
who would zealously defend their client and act the client’s ‘white knight’153 is alive and 
well. At least, for now, and in a small faction of the interview sample. These 4 lawyers 
represent the classic adversarial lawyer, but are a dying, rather than an extinct breed of 
lawyers in England and Wales.154 The tension created by the managerial agenda from the 
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CrimPR is clear and the lawyer is required to positively contribute to the efficiency of the 
system; this is clearly identifiable by having to enter a guilty plea at the first hearing.155 
Those in the Classic category thought the rule was an aberration and that zealous advocacy 
and an active defence cannot be undertaken adequately within a short period of time. Lawyer 
002 [Senior partner, 32 years’ experience] suggested that the courts were ‘asking you to nail 
your colours to the mast without operating with the full facts’; it is in this example where the 
technical lawyer is allowed to showcase their talents and offers up enough information to 
satisfy the courts but not at the expense of the client’s rights. However what needs to be 
tackled is the fact that the defence are all too frequently advising clients without full 
disclosure from the prosecution. With continued failings with the prosecutorial regime, it is 
time to start reform that particular area of the process. With the competing pressures of the 
managerial era, underscored by an overriding objective of ‘dealing with cases justly’, the 
defence lawyer is simply not permitted the time to wait for disclosure. In order to reassert the 
adversarial values, defence lawyers must be presented with full facts.  
Although the managerial landscape means that classic adversarial lawyers could be viewed a 
dying breed there is some semblance of traditional adversarialism in the Conflicted lawyers 
even if they were not as zealous in their pursuit of adversarial goals. They wanted to 
highlight the importance of the duty to the client but were quick to intimate that they had 
other duties such as fulfilling the overriding objective. The Procedural lawyer saw no 
problem with the rules and often thought they benefitted the system in terms of speed and 
efficiently, albeit not necessarily their client.  
In the modern managerial era, the need for adequate and timely prosecution disclosure is 
clear. The lack of timely disclosure impacts the ability of the defence lawyer to advise on an 
appropriate plea. Equally, a defendant may be pressured by his lawyer to enter a guilty plea 
or be tempted to do so because of the sentence discount. In such cases, there is a risk that the 
overriding objective of the CrimPR will be undermined – that is, to deal with cases justly, 
which includes acquitting the innocent and convicting the guilty.156 Whilst it is important to 
consider the effects of lengthy criminal proceedings on victims and witnesses, it is often the 
defendant who is forgotten in any reform. The rise of the CrimPR and its implicit goals of 
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managerialism have the potential to weaken the adversarial protections of the criminal 
justice. The accused is co-opted into the process and is almost compelled to participate in 
proceedings to satisfy the overriding objective. Whilst the criminal trial is not a game nor is it 
a single-minded pursuit for a conviction. The defendant is entitled to have the evidence 
against him tested and should they not wish to say anything, the defendant should not be 
compelled to participate; regardless if the court believes that ‘he knows if he has done it.’ 
This approach, highlighted by Lawyer 007, shows scant regard cornerstones of the 
adversarial process which encapsulate Packer’s Due Process protections. The disregard of 
safeguards has given rise to a process of co-operation accompanied by the common goal of 
efficiency, however these goals all seem to slanted against the defendant.  
 
There is undoubtedly an agenda, for better or worse, to encourage defendants to enter early 
guilty pleas, and it seems that should the defendant regret doing so, a remedy will rarely be 
offered by the courts.157 It is therefore imperative to ensure that any decision to enter a guilty 
plea is based on full and accurate evidence from the police and prosecution, made available at 
an early stage. This is arguably commensurate with the objectives of the CrimPR and the 
general culture change that has seen a drift away from pure adversarialism. If co-operation is 
to be encouraged, it should be done on an equal basis. This would ensure that the defence 
lawyer in the modern era can adequately advise the client as to plea. Moreover, it would re-
assert the adversarial tradition of English and Welsh criminal justice by moving away from a 
system that is reliant on a defendant entering a guilty plea because he ‘knows if he has done 
it’ and moving towards a system which reaffirms the due process cornerstones of 
adversarialism by requiring the prosecution to discharge the burden of proof, without any 
assistance from the defendant.  
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